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“What is the chief end of man? – to get rich. In what way? – 
dishonestly if we can, honestly if we must.” 
—Mark Twain 
“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and 
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; 
electric light the most efficient policeman.” 
—Justice Louis D. Brandeis 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 12, 2013, Bloomberg published an article exposing a 
practice by which traders for the world’s biggest international banks 
colluded to manipulate the benchmark for foreign currency exchange 
rates for their own profit.1  The article explained, “[t]he behavior 
occurred daily in the spot foreign-exchange market and has been 
going on for at least a decade, affecting the value of funds and 
derivatives.”2  The foreign currency exchange (forex or FX) market is 
the biggest market in the world, with a daily turnover rate of $5.3 
trillion as of April 2013.3  Yet, there is “no single global body to police 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Liam Vaughan, Gavin Finch & Ambereen Choudhury, Traders Said to 
Rig Currency Rates to Profit Off Clients, BLOOMBERG (June 11, 2013, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-11/traders-said-to-rig-currency-
rates-to-profit-off-clients [https://perma.cc/Q3AJ-R9GW]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 85TH ANNUAL REPORT: 1 APRIL 2014-31 
MARCH 2015, at 85 (2015).  The manipulated benchmark rates “are used as 
settlement values for currency derivatives . . . meaning that they largely determine 
the value of instruments worth some $3.3 trillion in daily trading.  About two trillion 
2016]FILLING THE REGULATORY VOID IN THE FX 141 
the massive 24/7 forex market.”4  “The FX market is like the Wild 
West,” according to a trader who spent twelve-years working at 
banks.5 
For two years investigations of this accusation went on, with the 
market unsure of how to proceed.6  Although the investigation is still 
continuing, it has so far resulted in over $10 billion in fines for seven 
of the world’s largest financial institutions,7 four banks pleading guilty 
to violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act,8 and over thirty of the 
banks’ top traders being fired, suspended, or put on leave.9  The 
investigation has sparked unprecedented regulatory scrutiny on the 
foreign currency exchange market.10 
The impact of foreign exchange benchmark rates on urban 
economies is profound.  According to Joseph Gold, former General 
Counsel of the International Monetary Fund, “for most countries, 
there is no single price which has such an important influence on both 
                                                                                                                 
dollars more is traded in the ‘spot’ market.” Andrew Verstein, Benchmark 
Manipulation, 56 B.C. L. REV. 215, 235-36 (2015). 
 4. Roger Aitken, Forex Market Regulation: Who Can Really Police This Global 
Market?, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2014, 10:25 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rogeraitken/2014/08/11/forex-market-regulation-who-
can-really-police-this-global-market/. 
 5. Vaughan, Finch & Choudhury, supra note 1. 
 6. See Richard Willsher, Why FX Needs Better Policy Synchronization and 
Trading Transparency, E-FOREX MAG. (April 2015), 
http://www.fxspotstream.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/e-forex-April-2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QEE2-3DX6] (“Uncertainty over the future course of regulation 
and whether more trading malpractice may come to light are continuing to cloud the 
foreign exchange market.”). 
 7. Karen Freifeld, David Henry & Steve Slater, Global Banks Admit Guilt in 
Forex Probe, Fined Nearly $6 Billion, REUTERS (May 20, 2015, 6:28 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-banks-forex-settlement-
idUSKBN0O50CQ20150520 [https://perma.cc/6PFQ-FUGE]. 
 8. Antoine Gara, Four Banks Plead Guilty to Foreign Exchange Collusion, UBS 
Pleads Guilty to Wire Fraud, FORBES (May 20, 2015, 11:12 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara/2015/05/20/four-banks-plead-guilty-to-
foreign-exchange-collusion-ubs-pleads-guilty-to-wire-fraud/#1ece824c48cd 
(explaining that a fifth bank, UBS, was granted immunity because of its cooperation 
in the FX investigation, but accepted a guilty plea to wire fraud for its violation of a 
non-prosecution agreement in connection with its involvement in manipulating 
LIBOR rates in 2012). 
 9. Suzi Ring & Hugo Miller, UBS Traders May Be First to Face Sanctions in 
Forex Probes, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 30, 2015, 11:00 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-01/seven-ubs-traders-may-be-first-
to-face-sanctions-in-fx-probes [https://perma.cc/3A2N-6H9X]. 
 10. See Rick Baert, Major Changes Are Coming Following FX Crackdown, 
PENSIONS & INVEST. (Dec. 22, 2014), 
http://www.pionline.com/article/20141222/PRINT/312229983/major-changes-are-
coming-following-fx-crackdown [https://perma.cc/MK8L-N58G]. 
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the financial world—in terms of asset values and rates of return, and 
on the real world—in terms of production, trade and employment.”11  
The benchmark rates are not only pivotal in the FX market, but the 
“Dow Jones Industrial Average, S&P 500, FTSE 100, and others 
equity indices all use the WM/Reuters benchmarks to compute the 
value of stocks denominated in foreign currency.”12  Seventy-five 
percent of all forex trading takes place in just five cities: London 
(41%); New York (19%); Singapore (5.7%); Tokyo (5.6%); and 
Hong Kong SAR (4.1%).13  Cities have long been centers for 
commerce, trade, and ideas, and the FX manipulation scheme poses a 
threat to the economies within these cities and the urban experiment 
generally. 
This Note aims to provide an approachable explanation of the 
complex FX regulatory scheme and how the manipulation came 
about, along with an analysis of the future of the market.  Part I of 
this Note outlines the history and structure of the FX market and 
explains the way the manipulation scheme worked.  Part II provides a 
detailed look at the market’s regulatory scheme.  Part III provides a 
discussion of the arguments for and against additional regulation and 
proposals that have been made.  Lastly, Part IV proposes a solution 
to the regulatory void present in the foreign exchange spot market: to 
create a reporting requirement for the purpose of monitoring and 
transparency and to impose more severe criminal sanctions. 
I.  MECHANICS OF THE FOREIGN CURRENCY MARKET AND 
MANIPULATION SCHEME 
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of the foreign currency 
exchange market, explains how the foreign exchange market 
functions, explains its impact on other global markets, and details the 
way the benchmark manipulation scheme worked. 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Richard Myrus, From Bretton Woods to Brussels: A Legal Analysis of the 
Exchange-Rate Arrangements of the International Monetary Fund and the 
European Community, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2095, 2095 (1994) (“Orderly exchange-
rate management is crucial for nations seeking to maintain stable price levels and 
sustained economic growth.  Exchange rate volatility has a chilling effect on both free 
trade and international investment because when exchange rates fluctuate 
significantly, profits become uncertain and businesses must hedge exchange-rate 
risks.  This uncertainty diminishes the willingness of enterprises to trade with their 
counterparts in other countries, ultimately resulting in reduced output and fewer jobs 
in affected industries.”). 
 12. Verstein, supra note 3, at 236. 
 13. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, TRIENNIAL CENTRAL BANK SURVEY: FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE TURNOVER IN APRIL 2013: PRELIMINARY GLOBAL RESULTS 8 (2013). 
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A. Brief History of Currency Market 
The stability of exchange rates14 is necessary to maintain economic 
growth and financial prosperity, affecting nearly all areas in 
international markets, including free trade and international 
investment.15  To provide exchange-rate stability, major industrial 
nations have proposed and engaged in a number of monetary systems 
throughout the twentieth century.16  The most successful system17 
emerged as a result of the Bretton Woods Accord in 1944.18  The 
conference19 resulted in the creation of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) and the 
formation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).20  The Bretton 
Woods Accord required the international community to scrutinize 
and control exchange-rate policies for the first time, rather than 
countries reserving oversight as a matter of national sovereignty.21  
The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund 
required that each nation would establish a par-value for its currency, 
defined in terms of gold or United States currency, and that this rate 
could only be changed or adjusted with the Fund’s authorization.22  
Exchange rates were not to rise or fall more than one percent of the 
                                                                                                                 
 14. An exchange rate is defined as: “[t]he price of one currency stated in terms of 
another currency.” CFTC Glossary, CFTC, 
http://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/EducationCenter/CFTCGlossary/index.htm
#E [https://perma.cc/3C72-VH3E] [hereinafter CFTC Glossary].  Exchange-rates 
generally refer to benchmark exchange rates. 
 15. See Myrus, supra note 11, at 2095. 
 16. Id. 
 17. The European Community Exchange Rate Mechanism (“ERM”) has also 
come close to maintaining exchange rate stability on a regional scale. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Seven hundred representatives from forty-four nations convened at the 
United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference held in Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire, in July of 1944. See GREGORY J. MILLMAN, THE VANDALS’ CROWN: HOW 
REBEL CURRENCY TRADERS OVERTHREW THE WORLD’S CENTRAL BANKS 55 (1995). 
 20. Myrus, supra note 11, at 2097.  The agreement was a compromise between the 
participating members’ goals to stabilize exchange rates. Id.  These goals included the 
expansion of world trade, international liquidity, and shielding domestic economies 
from foreign disturbances. Id. 
 21. Myrus, supra note 11, at 2098.  In the past, the power to control and maintain 
monetary policy was controlled exclusively by the government. See Ashton S. 
Phillips, Bank-Created Money, Monetary Sovereignty, and the Federal Deficit: 
Toward A New Paradigm in the Government-Spending Debate, 36 W. NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 221, 231 (2014) (“Indeed, the connection between sovereignty and monetary 
power is so well established that the State’s sovereignty over its own currency is 
traditionally recognized by public international law.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 22. Myrus, supra note 11, at 2099. 
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established par-value, necessarily prohibiting the exchange rates from 
floating against one another freely.23 
The system was essentially a gold standard, and the U.S. dollar had 
assumed the role of the key reserve currency by providing necessary 
liquidity.24  Eventually, with inflationary pressures, the accounts held 
in dollars began to exceed the U.S. monetary gold reserves, lowering 
the value of the dollar and the fixed rate system became 
unsustainable.25  The Bretton Woods Accord broke down by 1971 
when the United States officially withdrew from the exchange rate 
system.26  A Second Amendment to the Articles of the International 
Monetary Fund passed in 1978.27  Still in place today, this 
Amendment created a floating rate system,28 in which major 
currencies are allowed to float against one another.29  According to 
the Fund, “for want of a better label, the present system might 
therefore be characterized as a discretionary and decentralized 
system,”30 as opposed to the previous system directly controlled by 
the IMF. 
During the period of the Bretton Woods Agreement, the stability 
of currency rates left little room for speculation.31  The currency 
market was essentially a cash market, with currency exchanged only 
for the commercial purpose of doing business internationally.32  A 
bank customer would purchase foreign currency because of the actual 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 2100. 
 25. Id. at 2101. 
 26. Id. at 2102.  A second, short-lived fixed-exchange rate system, the 
Smithsonian Agreement was established by President Nixon in December of 1971. Id.  
This system also broke down by March of 1973. Id. at 2103. 
 27. Id. at 2103. 
 28. A floating exchange rate is “[a] country’s exchange rate regime where its 
currency is set by the foreign-exchange market through supply and demand for that 
particular currency relative to other currencies.  Thus, floating exchange rates change 
freely and are determined by trading in the forex market.  This is in contrast to a 
‘fixed exchange rate’ regime.” Floating Exchange Rate, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/floatingexchangerate.asp 
[https://perma.cc/7Y6R-8YY5]. 
 29. MILLMAN, supra note 19, at 74; Armando T. Belly, The Derivative Market in 
Foreign Currencies and the Commodity Exchange Act—The Status of Over-the-
Counter Futures Contracts, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1455, 1463-64 (1997); see also Myrus, 
supra note 11, at 2103. 
 30. Myrus, supra note 11, at 2103 (citing Int’l Monetary Fund, The Exchange Rate 
System: Lessons of the Past and Options for the Future, Occasional Paper No. 30, at 
40 (1984)). 
 31. Belly, supra note 29, at 1464. 
 32. See id. 
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need to use it in a transaction.33  The FX market has since evolved 
with the adoption of a floating rate system, with speculative 
instruments now playing a substantial role.34 
B. Financial Instruments in Foreign Exchange Markets 
Currency transactions take place in a number of different forms.  
The distinction between the spot market and these financial 
instruments is necessary to a complete understanding of the 
regulatory scheme of this market.  As discussed in Part II, financial 
legislation and regulation identify and govern each instrument 
individually.  This Part defines spot transactions, forwards, futures, 
swaps, and options. 
1. Spots 
A spot trade is the most basic currency transaction, upon which all 
financial instruments are built.35  A spot transaction is not a financial 
instrument at all, but is “simply the exchange of one currency for 
another currency, at the current or spot rate, or a ‘currency pair.’”36  It 
is an agreement between two private parties, typically two banks, to 
exchange a specified quantity of one currency for another for 
immediate delivery, typically within two days.37  For example, Bank X 
may contract to sell €100 million to Bank Y for U.S. dollars at an 
exchange rate38 of 1.10 euro per dollar.  Bank X would receive $110 
million in exchange for its €100 million. 
2. Derivatives 
Financial instruments derive their price from the exchange rate 
determined in the spot market.  Derivative products are financial 
instruments whose value is determined by an underlying commodity 
or financial product such as a stock or a bond.39  Those who buy and 
sell currency derivatives have two goals in mind: to hedge the risk of 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See infra Part I.B.1 and accompanying text. 
 34. See infra Part I.B.2 and accompanying text. 
 35. RAJ BHALA, THE LAW OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE 9 (1997). 
 36. John W. Labuszweski, Sanda Rio & David Gibbs, Currencies: Understanding 
FX Futures, CME GROUP (Apr. 22, 2013), 
https://www.cmegroup.com/education/files/understanding-fx-futures.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LV5E-YSMX]. 
 37. BHALA, supra note 35, at 9. 
 38. An exchange rate is “[t]he price of one currency in terms of another 
currency.” CFTC Glossary, supra note 14. 
 39. BHALA, supra note 35, at 7. 
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currency rate fluctuations and to profit off of accurate prediction of 
future currency rates.40  Forwards,41 futures,42 swaps,43 and options44 
are derivative instruments. 
Derivatives are instruments of speculation.45  The parties are quite 
literally purchasing and taking bets that certain events in the market 
will or will not occur in the future.46  These instruments were, and still 
are by some, considered to be a danger to the financial industry.  
Warren Buffet, for example, has called derivatives “financial weapons 
of mass destruction.”47  The word “derivatives” has also been referred 
to as “the 11-letter, four letter word,” by Richard Syron, the 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id. 
 41. A forward contract is nearly identical to a spot transaction, but the parties 
agree to defer the date of exchange to a later time. Labuszweski, Rio & Gibbs, supra 
note 36, at 2-3.  For example, a German company may know that it needs to buy an 
American product a month from the time at which it makes a contract.  The German 
company may contract to buy the same $110 million for euros at the same rate.  The 
purpose behind forward contracts is to hedge—or mitigate—the risk of losing money 
due to currency rate fluctuations between the time the forward contract is made and 
the time the contract matures. Id. at 3-4. 
 42. Futures, like forwards, are contracts to buy or sell foreign currency at a fixed 
rate in the future. BHALA, supra note 35, at 19.  The most important distinction 
between futures and forwards is that futures are standardized contracts lacking any 
customization for any particular party, whereas forwards are geared for a particular 
transaction. Id. at 20. 
 43. A swap is simultaneously a series of spot transactions and forward 
transactions.  “An FX swap may be thought of as a combination of two offsetting 
currency transactions separated by time and constitute the largest segment of the FX 
marketplace in terms of daily turnover.” Labuszweski, Rio & Gibbs, supra note 36, at 
4.  An FX swap is to be distinguished from a “currency swap,” which “entails an 
element of an FX swap as well as an element of an interest rate swap.” Id. 
 44. Options are categorized as “call options,” or the right to buy currency at some 
point in the future for a specified price, and “put options,” which is the right to sell 
currency in the future. BHALA, supra note 35, at 29.  These are generally referred to 
as calls and puts. Id. at 31-34.  What one is essentially purchasing in buying options is 
simply the right, not the obligation, to sell or buy at a certain price. Id. at 29.  The 
option buyer, in effect, pays the seller to assume all of the risk of market fluctuations, 
and in exchange the seller receives a premium for this service. MILLMAN, supra note 
19, at 10.  If the price of a currency increases, the right to buy it at a lower price (a call 
option) will be valuable to a purchaser, and if the price to a currency decreases, the 
right to sell it at a higher price (a put option) will be similarly valuable. Id. 
 45. See Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 
1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2011) (“Derivatives are literally bets—agreements 
between parties that one will pay the other a sum of money that is determined by 
whether or not a particular event occurs in the future.” (emphasis added)). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Brian M. McCall, Gambling on Our Financial Future: How the Federal 
Government Fiddles While State Common Law Is a Safer Bet to Prevent Another 
Financial Collapse, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1347 (2014). 
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Chairman of the American Stock Exchange.48  The speculative nature 
of derivatives, as opposed to the practical and commercial nature of 
spot transactions, has lead to a distinction in the way these two types 
of transactions are regulated.49 
C. How the Forex Market Works 
With the exception of futures and options, the FX market is 
geographically dispersed, decentralized, and takes place between 
private parties, rather than through a central exchange.50  This over 
the counter (OTC) system is divided into two tiers: the retail tier and 
the wholesale tier.51  In the retail tier, most parties transact with banks 
to exchange currencies.52  The banks are typically able to match these 
retail deals on their own books.  Any remaining balances are offset in 
the wholesale market, where banks exchange currency in the 
traditional interbank, or inter-dealer market.53  The central banks are 
known as “market makers,”54 and “therefore play a critical role in 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Lydie Nadia Cabrera Pierre-Louis, Controlling A Financial Jurassic Park 
Obtaining Jurisdiction over Derivatives by Regulating Illegal Foreign Currency 
Boiler Rooms, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 35, 35 (2007). 
 49. See infra Part II. 
 50. FIN. STABILITY BD., FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS FINAL REPORT 5 
(2014), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_140930.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX93-
HY8C] [hereinafter FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS]. 
 51. Michael R. King, Carol Osler & Dagfinn Rime, Foreign Exchange Market 
Structure, Players and Evolution 24 (Norges Bank, Working Paper, 2011), 
http://www.unich.it/~vitale/Rime-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PRL-H6NY].  This clear 
distinction has broken down with the creation of new trading platforms such as 
multibank trading systems (“MBT”) and FX prime brokerage (“PB”), which allow 
for customers to trade directly with FX dealers. Id.  Banks have also created single-
bank trading systems (SBT), which allow customers to enter orders to be fulfilled 
within the bank itself. Id. at 25. 
 52. These parties include governments, hedge funds, corporations, institutional 
investors and high net-worth individuals. Dagfinn Rime & Andreas Schrimpf, The 
Anatomy of the Global FX Market Through the Lens of the 2013 Triennial Survey, 
BIS Q. REV. 29 (2013), http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1312e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8E2P-EX2X]. 
 53. Id.  A dealer is “[a] financial institution that is entering into transactions on 
both sides of the markets, seeking profits by taking risks in those markets and by 
earning a spread; sometimes also referred to as a ‘sell-side.’” Id. at 43. 
 54. “Market makers ‘make’ or set both the bid and the ask prices on their systems 
and display them publicly on their quote screens. Grace Cheng, Market Makers vs. 
Electronic Communications Networks, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/forex/06/ecnmarketmaker.asp#ixzz3vBMpyVPF 
[https://perma.cc/4LJV-7XZC].  They stand prepared to make transactions at these 
prices with their customers, who range from banks to retail forex traders. Id.  In 
doing this, market makers provide some liquidity to the market.” Id. 
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ensuring the continued functioning of the market,”55 by virtue of both 
buying and selling currencies.56 
Electronic platforms facilitate both the interbank and retail 
markets. The two most used platforms are the Thomas Reuters 
Dealing (Reuters) and the Electronic Broking Service (EBS).57  The 
lower transaction costs of electronic trading have greatly reduced the 
bid-ask spread58 between the retail market and the interbank market, 
reducing the profit to banks at the retail level.59  This decrease in 
profit and the need to invest in technology to access electronic 
platforms have reduced the number of banks at the highest level of 
the FX market.60 
Further, although these electronic platforms facilitate anonymous 
trading, banks must identify and give prior authorization to deal with 
each other bank, essentially creating “an invitation only market.”61  
The minimum trade amount for the interbank market is typically $5 
million and is too large an amount for smaller banks to be able to 
participate.62  As a result, four banks make up 50% of the market.63  
                                                                                                                 
 55. Plea Agreement at 4, United States v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 3:15-cr-
79(SRU) (D. Conn. May 20, 2015).  This decentralized market is open for trading 
twenty-four hours a day. See FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS, supra note 50, at 5.  
The market opens at 5:00 a.m. in Sydney every Monday morning and closes at 5:00 
p.m. in New York every Friday. Id. 
 56. Around the year 2000, retail-oriented platforms began to bundle many small 
trades together and then sell them to the interbank market. Rime & Schrimpf, supra 
note 52, at 39.  These “retail aggregators” have received better prices than they would 
have selling individually. Id. 
 57. King, Osler & Rime, supra note 51, at 22. 
 58. The bid-ask spread is the difference between the price a bank is willing to pay 
(the bid price) and the price a bank is willing to sell (the ask or offer price) foreign 
currency. CFTC Glossary, supra note 14.  The profit banks earn is the difference 
between the bid-ask spread, which compensates them for the risk they take that the 
exchange rate will drop before they find another buyer. 
 59. King, Osler & Rime supra note 51, at 29. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Verstein, supra note 3, at 238. 
 62. See id.  €1 million is the minimum trade size on the interdealer market; €5 
million is the upper range for most interdealer trades; and €25 million is the level at 
which customer trades are typically handled with human intervention. Geir Høidal 
Bjønnes, Neophytos Kathitziotis & Carol Osler, The Cost of FX Liquidity: Empirical 
Tests of Competing Theories 8 (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.ifw-kiel.de/konfer/staff-
seminar/paper/2014/Bjonnes.pdf [https://perma.cc/VY44-QX8R] (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with Brandeis Univ.). 
 63. Vaughan, Finch & Choudhury, supra note 1.  These four banks are: Deutsche 
Bank AG; Citigroup Inc.; Barclays Plc.; and UBS AG. Id. 
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In 2013, 98% of the U.S. spot market consisted of trades by ten 
firms.64  The largest five firms accounted for 80% of the spot market.65 
D. Benchmarks 
A benchmark is “a standard against which foreign exchange rates 
may be measured.”66  Essentially, a benchmark is a standardized spot 
exchange rate of two currencies.67  Thousands of transactions occur in 
the FX market every day with parties exchanging currencies at 
different rates.  A benchmark gives buyers an idea of what the 
exchange rate between two currencies might be for any given day by 
providing a standard rate.  There are two important benchmark rates 
for the FX market: the World Markets/Reuters fix (WM/Reuters) and 
the European Central Bank fix (ECB). 
The WM/Reuters fix was created in 199468 for the purpose of 
providing “a clear single independent reference rate for the foreign 
exchange market.”69  The WM/Reuters is, by and large, the prominent 
FX benchmark.70  In addition to the FX market, WM/Reuters is also 
used as a key input in multi-currency equity, bond, and credit 
indices.71  It is hardwired directly into other benchmarks such as the 
DOW Jones and S&P 500.72  The Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) notes that the “WM/R[euters] Rates are the 
most widely referenced FX benchmark rates in the United States and 
globally.”73  As a result, the WM/Reuters fix has a direct and 
consequential effect on financial markets, beyond currency 
exchanges, around the world. 
                                                                                                                 
 64. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND INTEREST RATE 
DERIVATIVES MARKETS: TURNOVER IN THE UNITED STATES, APRIL 2013, at 6 (2013), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/markets/pdf/2013triennialreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8JW8-QEZF]. 
 65. Id. 
 66. THE WM COMPANY, WM/REUTERS SPOT & FORWARD RATES METHODOLOGY 
GUIDE 17 (2012), http://www.wmcompany.com/pdfs/WMReutersMethodology.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9FRP-EBYH]. 
 67. BHALA, supra note 35, at 9. 
 68. “The WM/Reuters service is a joint venture between The WM Company and 
Thomson Reuters.” History, WM COMPANY, 
http://www.wmcompany.com/wmr/AboutUs/History/ [https://perma.cc/C6JU-8CSX]. 
 69. FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS, supra note 50, at 7. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1. 
 72. Verstein, supra note 3, at 236. 
 73. In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., CFTC No. 15-04, 2014 WL 6068387, at *2 
(Nov. 11, 2014). 
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WM/Reuters calculates spot fix rates, forward rates, and non-
deliverable forward rates, providing spot fix rates for 160 currencies.74  
WM/Reuters calculates these rates with two different methods, 21 
trade currencies and 139 non-trade currencies.75  Also known as the 
4pm London Fix, WM/Reuters records the exchanges of single trades 
during the thirty seconds before and the thirty seconds after 4:00pm 
London time using transactional and quote data from the Thomson 
Reuters Matching and EBS trading platforms.76  The WM/Reuters 
benchmark is the average rate of exchange during this one-minute 
period.77 
The ECB provides foreign exchange rates for the euro against 
thirty-two different currencies on a daily basis.78  The ECB rates are 
based upon trade information within and outside the European 
System of Central Banks at 2:15pm Central European Time.79  A 
number of institutions, particularly non-financial corporations, use 
this benchmark.  The ECB rates use has increased as a result of the 
FX benchmark investigations.80 
Traders are well aware of the calculation of these benchmarks and 
structure their trading around them.  To prevent affecting the 
benchmark, they may trade on electronic platforms other than the 
Reuters or ESB or they may buy and sell over the telephone.81  A 
trader can push the benchmark higher or lower by timing transactions 
around the 4 PM and 2:15 PM periods used for the benchmarks.  For 
                                                                                                                 
 74. FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS, supra note 50, at 8. 
 75. Id.  This note will discuss the calculation method for trade currencies; for an 
explanation of the calculation for non-trade currencies, see id. at 10. 
 76. Id. at 8.  The FX market continues to trade through and after the main 4:00 
p.m. London fixing window, even though the 4:00 p.m. rate is often referred to as a 
‘closing’ rate. Id. at 5, 15. 
 77. This rate has been extended to five minutes. See infra note 298 and 
accompanying text. 
 78. FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS, supra note 50, at 11. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See In re Citibank, N.A., CFTC No. 15-03, 2014 WL 6068386, at *4 (Nov. 11, 
2014) (explaining banks strategically offset some position outside of the polled 
window and venue); BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING IN 
THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET 9 (2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/mktc05.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FK2Q-4R2H?type=pdf] (“They can evade detection . . . by 
executing large flows in less transparent venues, including reverting to transacting 
bilaterally over the telephone.”).  This is evidenced by the decrease in concentration 
of interdealer transactions conducted on Reuters and ESB (those platforms that 
determine the exchange rate benchmark) from 22% in 2010 to 16% in 2013 and the 
noticeable increase in turnover rates during the time before and after the WMR 
London 4pm fix. FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS, supra note 50, at 1. 
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example, if a trader wanted the Euro/Dollar exchange rate to go from 
1.0770 to 1.0785, he would make sure to be trading at or above a rate 
of 1.0785 in significant quantities during the one minute fix period. 
E. Incentive Structure 
A bank typically acts as a dealer, buying and selling currency to its 
customers throughout the day.  In these transactions, banks guarantee 
their customers the benchmark rate that day before the fix and thus 
agree to contract with customers at an unknown price to be 
determined during the fix calculation window.82  This “trading ahead” 
means that the banks take on the risk that the benchmark rate will 
move against them and creates an incentive to move the rates in their 
favor.83  It was this structure that incentivized FX dealers to try to 
manipulate the benchmark rate and to make a profit by collusion and 
sharing confidential client information.84  The goal was to push the 
benchmark rate up or down, depending on the customer orders they 
had as a collective group, in order to create the maximum profit for 
the traders.85 
F. How the Manipulation Scheme Worked 
As early as 2006, regulators were alerted to trouble with the 
London fix when bankers hinted that “players that had no particular 
interest in that fix” were moving prices.86  Seven years later, in June 
2013, Bloomberg published an article suggesting that the foreign 
currency rates were rigged.87  Over two years of investigation by 
                                                                                                                 
 82. FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS, supra note 50, at 2. 
 83. See Claer Barrett & John Aglionby, Traders’ Forex Chatroom Banter 
Exposed, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014, 2:09 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/47c32ec4-6a34-11e4-8fca-00144feabdc0.html#slide0 
[https://perma.cc/4BY4-F5WD]. 
 84. See Chiara Albanese, Forex Scandal Drives Shift to Algo Trading, WALL ST. 
J. (Sept. 28, 2015, 8:51 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/forex-scandal-drives-shift-
to-algo-trading-1443444666?alg=y [https://perma.cc/U92G-2285] [hereinafter 
Albanese, Forex Scandal Drives Shift to Algo Trading]. 
 85. See FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS, supra note 50, at 2. 
 86. Marion Dakers, How the Forex Trading Scandal Came to Light, TELEGRAPH 
(Nov. 13, 2014, 6:47 AM) 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/11227006/How-
the-forex-trading-scandal-came-to-light.html [https://perma.cc/53M6-U63L]; James 
Quinn & John Ficenec, The Lunch Meetings at the Heart of the Bank of England 
Forex Inquiry, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 12, 2014, 11:30 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/bank-of-england/10685543/The-lunch-meetings-
at-the-heart-of-the-Bank-of-England-forex-inquiry.html [https://perma.cc/X2YW-
2T3K]. 
 87. See Vaughan, Finch & Choudhury, supra note 1. 
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dozens of regulatory and government agencies around the world 
revealed a long and intricate scheme in which traders for the world’s 
biggest international banks manipulated the foreign currency 
exchange benchmark for their own profit.88  Traders used private 
electronic chat rooms with names such as “the players,” “the three 
musketeers,”89 “The Cartel,” “The Mafia,” and “The Bandits’ Club”90 
to communicate and attempt to manipulate the benchmark by trading 
disproportionately during the fix period to profit from their clients’ 
positions.91  Traders would have multiple chat rooms open at once, 
each one focusing on a particular currency pair.92  The conversations 
were often in slang, used code words, and intentionally used poor 
grammar and spelling to evade systematic checks.93 
Membership in the chat rooms was exclusive and by invitation 
only.94  For example, consider the following conversation between 
bankers considering allowing a new member into the chat room: 
UBS Trader: 7:49:55 are we ok with keeping this as is .. ie the info 
lvls  & risk sharing? 
Citibank Trader: 7:50:27 well...  
UBS Trader: 7:50:30 that is the qu[estion]  
Citibank Trader: 7:50:32 you know him best obv...  
7:50:39 if you think we need to adjust it 
7:50:43 then he shouldn’t be[] in chat 
JPMC Trader: 7:50:54 yeah that is key  
7:51:00 simple question [UBS trader] 
7:51:08 I trust you implicitly [UBS trader] 
7:51:13 and your judgement  
7:51:16 you know him  
                                                                                                                 
 88. Dakers, supra note 86. 
 89. Chad Bray, Jenny Anderson & Ben Protess, Big Banks Are Fined $4.25 
Billion in Inquiry Into Currency-Rigging, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 12, 2014, 
2:24 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/british-and-u-s-regulators-fine-
big-banks-3-16-billion-in-foreign-exchange-scandal/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/CA2L-
XQSZ]. 
 90. Elvis Picardo, How the Forex “Fix” May Be Rigged, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 2, 
2014), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/forex/031714/how-forex-fix-may-be-
rigged.asp [https://perma.cc/JN2T-D55R]. 
 91. Five Major Banks Agree to Parent-Level Guilty Pleas, DEP’T JUSTICE (May 
20, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-major-banks-agree-parent-level-guilty-
pleas [https://perma.cc/W4XX-V35R] [hereinafter Five Major Banks Agree to 
Parent-Level Guilty Pleas]. 
 92. In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 6068387, at *4 (Nov. 11, 2014). 
 93. Id. at *5. 
 94. Id. at *4. 
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7:51:21 will he tell rest of desk stuff  
7:51:26 or god forbin his nyk... 
Citibank Trader: 7:51:46 yes  
        7:51:51 that’s really imp[ortant] q[uestion]  
        7:52:01 dont want other numpty’s in mkt to know  
        7:52:17 but not only that  
        7:52:21 is he gonna protect us  
7:52:33 like we protect each other against our own    
branches 
7:52:46 ie if you guys are rhs95.. and my nyk is 
lhs..ill say my nyk lhs in few  
UBS Trader: 7:53:52 what concerns me is that i know he’ll never 
tell us when at risk...96 
The traders decided to let the fourth trader from Barclays into the 
chat room on a “1 month trial” basis, before which he was told “mess 
this up and sleep with one eye open.”97 
The traders used a number of strategies.  According to the CFTC 
Order filing and settling charges against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. 
(JPMC) filed on November 11, 2014: 
At times, in certain chat rooms, FX traders at JPMC and 
other banks disclosed confidential customer order 
information and trading positions, altered trading 
positions to accommodate the interests of the collective 
group, and agreed on trading strategies as part of an 
effort by the group to attempt to manipulate certain FX 
benchmark rates, in some cases downward and in some 
cases upward.98 
Traders would exchange information about their respective banks’ 
net position and attempt to coordinate their trades.  One method the 
traders used was a practice known as “netting off.”99  If one trader 
had a net position in the opposite direction as the other traders in the 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Traders used “right-hand side” (rhs) and “left-hand side” (lhs) to refer to the 
currency that they were selling. For example, a trader’s position looking to sell 
EUR/USD would be “lhs.” Id. 
 96. Id.; see also In re Citibank, N.A., 2014 WL 6068386, at *5 (Nov. 11, 2014); In 
re UBS AG, CFTC No. 15-06, 2014 WL 6068389, at *5 (Nov. 11, 2014). 
 97. Kevin McCoy & Kevin Johnson, 5 Banks Guilty of Rate–rigging, Pay More 
than $5B, USA TODAY (May 20, 2015), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/05/20/billions-in-bank-fx-
settlements/27638443/ [https://perma.cc/93HC-RSJW]. 
 98. In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 6068387, at *2. 
 99. Id. at *5. 
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group before the fix period, he would try to sell those positions with 
traders outside of the chat room in order to maintain the groups’ 
overall position in the same direction.100 
The Southern District of New York (SDNY) explains other specific 
strategies traders allegedly used in more detail in an order denying in 
part and granting in part a motion to dismiss a private action against 
the banks: 
[1] “Front running” or “trading ahead”—Defendants 
traded their own proprietary positions before executing 
their customers’ large market-moving trades so that 
Defendants could take positions to their benefit and “to 
the detriment of the customer;”101 [2] “Banging the 
close”—Because the calculation of the Fix does not 
weight the trades by amount traded and takes into 
account only the number of trades in any currency pair, 
traders conspired to impact the Fix by engaging in more 
trades. To this end, traders broke up larger orders into 
smaller amounts and concentrated the trades in the 
minutes before and after the Fixing Window to affect 
the Fix; [and 3] “Painting the screen”—Defendants’ 
traders placed fake orders with other Defendants to 
create the illusion of trading activity in a given direction 
to move rates prior to the Fixing Window.  These trades 
were not actually executed.102 
In contrast to “banging the close,” another widely reported 
strategy to manipulate the benchmark was “building ammo” where 
one trader would accumulate a large quantity in a currency and then 
sell the “ammo” right before or during the fix period in an effort to 
move the benchmark.103  For example: 
On January 6, 2012, one Barclays trader, who was also 
a Head of the FX Spot desk in London, attempted to 
manipulate the ECB fix by unloading EUR 500 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. 
 101. Front-running is technically legal in the FX market. See infra Part III.B. 
 102. In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., 74 F. Supp. 3d 581, 
587-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
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million right at the fix time, stating in the Cartel chat 
room “i saved 500 for last second” and in another chat 
room “i had 500 to jam it.”104 
In another example the traders had the following exchange: 
Bank W Trader: 3:46:53  i’d prefer we join forces 
Bank Y Trader: 3:46:56   perfick  
3:46:59   lets do this... 
3:47:11   lets double team them   
Bank W Trader: 3:47:12  YESssssssssssss105 
Immediately after the fixing window, the traders congratulated 
themselves: 
Bank W Trader: 4:03:25   sml rumour we haven’t lost it 
Bank Y Trader: 4:03:45    we 
4:03:46    do 
4:03:48    dollarrr106 
The conversations make clear that the traders knew what they were 
doing was illegal.  When one HSBC trader was left out of a collusion 
he scolded another trader, “[you] are uselees[sic] . . .  how can I make 
free money with no ****ing heads up.”107  In 2010, a Barclays 
employee was quoted as saying in one chat: “markup is making sure 
you make the right decision on price . . . .which is [what’s] the worst 
price [I] can put on this where the customers decision to trade with 
me or give me future business doesn’t change . . . .if you aint cheating, 
you aint trying.”108 
This statement reveals the state of trading in forex during the years 
of collusion.  The traders decided on what the forex benchmarks 
would be based upon their profit margin rather than the actual 
demands of the market.  For years, traders at the largest firms in the 
world engaged in these conversations every day with the purpose of 
manipulating the market to make as much money off of their 
customer’s orders as they could. 
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II.  CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME OF THE FX MARKET 
The foreign currency markets have been the subject of numerous 
crimes, resulting in a loss of $460 million to nearly 26,000 people in 
the United States between 2001 and 2007.109  Further, as a result of 
their actions before and after the financial crisis, banks have been 
subject to $100 billion in United States legal fines alone since the 
crisis hit.110  Despite this, the spot market is still largely unregulated.111  
For the vast majority of its history the foreign currency market has 
not come under the authority of any legislative act.  In recent years, 
other financial instruments such as swaps, options, futures, and 
derivatives have all come under legislation.112  The spot market, 
however, has been explicitly exempted from each act and remains 
unregulated in the United States,113 the UK,114 and Europe,115 leaving a 
regulatory void in this market. 
This lack of regulation has led to a scarcity in market data, as there 
is no single reporting agency or corporation for the market as a 
whole.  Unlike stocks and commodities, which have highly regulated 
and carefully watched markets, “on any given day no one knows how 
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much was traded in FX markets – not the regulators, not the 
monetary authorities, not even the major FX dealers.”116  When asked 
why it took regulators so long to find out about the manipulation, the 
CEO of the Financial Conduct Authority, a financial regulatory body 
in the UK answered, “[these] are not regulated markets.  So, the spot 
FX market is not a regulated market.  Where it’s not a regulated 
market, we don’t get regular reports. . . .  We don’t have things we can 
monitor. . . .”117  The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
compiles the only source of aggregate data for the FX market every 
three years in the Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign 
Exchange Market Activity in an effort by central banks around the 
world every third April.118 
Despite this void, it was previously thought that the immense size 
of the market and its liquidity119 served to prevent market 
manipulation from occurring.  As stated in 2012: “Fortunately, the FX 
market is sufficiently liquid that significant manipulation by any single 
actor is all but impossible during active trading hours for the major 
currencies.”120  The regulatory void, evidently, was not thought to 
have been problematic whatsoever but that it was merely a by-
product of the immense size of the FX market. 
This Part provides a discussion of the history of foreign exchange 
regulation and outlines the numerous laws Congress passed and 
regulations agencies promulgated, ultimately showing that while all 
foreign exchange instruments have come under the jurisdiction of 
some regulation, spot transactions are still largely unregulated.  Each 
subpart discusses the specific sanctions brought in relation to this 
scheme by each regulatory body.  Part II.D provides an overview of 
international foreign exchange regulation, concluding the same.  Part 
II.F then discusses the remaining repercussions of the manipulation 
scheme. 
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A. Commodities Futures Trading Commission 
1. Commodities Exchange Act 
The first piece of legislation to purport to regulate the foreign 
currency market was the Commodities Exchange Act.121  The 
Commodities Exchange Act was rooted in concerns over speculation 
in wheat prices.122  The volatility of grain prices caused the forward 
grain market to develop into one of speculation, in which investors 
would trade futures and derivative contracts, the profits and losses of 
which depended upon the rise and fall of grain prices.123  Congress 
enacted the Futures Trading Act in 1921 to regulate excessive 
speculation.124  This Act has developed into the modern Commodities 
Exchange Act (“CEA”).125  Congress established the Commodities 
Futures Trading Commission as an independent federal regulatory 
agency by an amendment to the Act in 1974.126  The CEA is the 
principal means by which all commodity future transactions in the 
United States are regulated.127 
Spots and forward transactions are exempted from regulation 
under the CEA.  The Act gives the CFTC the authority to regulate 
“contracts for sale of a commodity for future delivery,” typically 
called “commodity futures contracts.”128  While the CEA does not 
provide a precise definition for a sale “for future delivery” the Act 
does explicitly state that “[t]he term ‘“future delivery’” does not 
include any sale of any cash commodity for deferred shipment or 
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delivery.”129  Spot transactions were excluded as sales for a cash 
commodity, not for future delivery, and forwards were excluded as a 
sale “for deferred shipment or delivery.”130  This regulatory 
distinction was made because it was thought that spot transactions, 
which deal with the actual commodity (currency), do not present the 
same incentive for manipulation as speculative instruments do.131  
This subtle but immensely consequential distinction has brought 
about much litigation regarding what transactions are defined as 
futures, and therefore fall within the Act, and which transactions are 
defined as spots132 and forwards and are exempt from regulation.133 
2. Treasury Amendment 
While the definition of “future delivery” exempted spot and 
forward foreign currency transactions, the remaining foreign currency 
instruments were exempted through the Treasury Amendment.134  
The Amendment states: “Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to 
govern or in any way be applicable to transactions in foreign currency 
[or a variety of financial instruments] unless such transactions involve 
the sale thereof for future delivery conducted on a board of trade.”135  
The legislative history cites concerns that transactions in foreign 
currency, “carried out through an informal network of banks and 
tellers” are “more properly supervised by the bank regulatory 
agencies.”136  The legislative history states that because of this 
alternative way to regulate banking activity, regulation of the FX 
market under the CEA was unnecessary. 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Id. § 1a(27). 
 130. See Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 970-71 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing 
Pub. L. No. 67–66, 42 Stat. 187); CFTC v. Am. Bd. of Trade, 473 F. Supp. 1177 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff’d, 803 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 131. See Tauber, 8 F.3d at 970-71. 
 132. CFTC v. Calvary Currencies LLC, 437 F. Supp. 2d 453, 460 (D. Md. 2006). 
 133. See Elizabeth D. Lauzon, What Are “Contracts of Sale of a Commodity for 
Future Delivery” Within Meaning of Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 et 
seq.), 182 A.L.R. Fed. 559 (2002). 
 134. 7 U.S.C. § 2(c) (2014).  As Congress considered the passage of the CEA, 
Department of the Treasury sent a letter expressing concern about the impositions 
the new act would have on interbank currency market, proposed that Congress create 
an exemption for transactions and leave banking regulation to the Comptroller of 
Currency and Federal Reserve. Belly, supra note 29, at 1482.  The Act incorporated 
language nearly identical to that proposed by the Department of Treasury in what is 
known as the Treasury Amendment. Id. 
 135. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2014). 
 136. S. Rep. No. 93-1131, at 23 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843, 
5863, 5887. 
160 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIII 
The scope of the CFTC was changed in the Commodities Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000.137  The CFMA explicitly removed the 
CFTC’s power to regulate OTC derivatives trade among 
“sophisticated parties,” in addition to extending the CFTC’s power to 
regulating OTC futures transactions with a retail customer on one 
side.138  The CFMA’s deregulation has had such profound effects that 
it has been credited with being the “most direct and significant cause” 
of the financial crisis of 2008.139 
3. Dodd-Frank Act 
The Dodd-Frank Act,140 passed in light of the 2008 financial crisis 
“put in place a comprehensive set of reforms to help build stronger, 
safer, and more efficient financial markets.”141  The Act brought 
nearly all foreign exchange instruments under the jurisdiction of the 
CFTC or the SEC.  The Act requires all swaps to be traded on a 
central exchange and secured by a clearinghouse and regulated by the 
CFTC or the SEC.  The Act provided the U.S. Department of 
Treasury (Treasury Department) with authority to determine if 
foreign exchange transactions may be exempt from these 
requirements.142  On November 16, 2012, the Treasury Department 
issued a final ruling providing that foreign exchange transactions are 
exempt from the definition of a “swap” under the CEA,143 and thus 
are excluded from some regulations under the Dodd-Frank Act. 
                                                                                                                 
 137. See Commodities Future Modernization Act of 2000, H.R. 4541, 106th Cong. 
(2000). 
 138. Regulation of Forex in the Wake of Dodd-Frank. FOLEY & LARDNER LLP 
(Oct. 14, 2011), https://www.foley.com/regulation-of-forex-in-the-wake-of-dodd-
frank-10-14-2011/ [https://perma.cc/8NZ4-VQLE]. 
 139. Stout, supra note 45 (“The crisis was caused, first and foremost, by changes in 
the law. In particular, the crisis was the direct, foreseeable, and in fact 
foreseen . . . consequence of the CFMA’s sudden and wholesale removal of centuries-
old legal constraints on speculative trading in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 140. See Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, Tit.VII, 124 Stat 1376 
(2010). 
 141. Fact Sheet: Final Determination, supra note 112. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See Determination of Foreign Exchange Swaps and Foreign Exchange 
Forwards under the Commodity Exchange Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 69694, 69694 (Nov. 16, 
2012); Silla Brush, U.S. Treasury Exempts Foreign Exchange Swaps from Dodd-
Frank, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 16, 2012, 9:26 PM) 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-11-16/u-s-treasury-exempts-foreign-
exchange-swaps-from-dodd-frank [https://perma.cc/5YRN-ZCS8]. 
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Deutsche Bank AG, Bank of New York Mellon Corp., UBS AG, 
and other banks supported the determination, while the Treasury 
Department met resistance by regulators and Democratic 
lawmakers.144  The Treasury Department stated: “Unlike other 
derivatives, FX swaps and forwards already trade in a highly-
transparent, liquid and efficient market.”145  Even with this 
determination, FX swaps and forwards “remain subject to the Dodd-
Frank Act’s new requirement to report trades to repositories and 
rigorous business conduct standards.”146  Thus, FX instruments are 
now subject to limited regulations under the Dodd-Frank Act. 
The CFTC and SEC issued a final joint rule interpreting the Dodd-
Frank Act on August 12, 2013 to address concerns that spot 
transactions may be considered an exchange “on a specific date in the 
future” and would thus qualify as a foreign exchange forward under 
the Act.147  The rule states: “The CEA generally does not confer 
regulatory jurisdiction on the CFTC with respect to spot 
transactions.”148  The Commissions then provide clarification that “a 
bona fide foreign exchange spot transaction, i.e., a foreign exchange 
transaction that is settled on the customary timeline of the relevant 
spot market, is not within the definition of the term “swap,” and thus 
not subject to regulation.149  The customary timeline “of a two-day 
settlement for spot foreign currency transactions has been recognized 
by the CFTC and the courts.”150  However, depending on “relevant 
facts and circumstances” that may affect that timeline, “the 
Commissions will consider a foreign exchange transaction that is 
entered into solely to effect the purchase or sale of a foreign security 
to be a bona fide spot transaction where certain conditions are 
met.”151  The rule thus clarified that the CFTC and the SEC do not 
intend to impose any regulatory power upon traditional spot 
transactions. 
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 146. Id. 
 147. See Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-
Based Swap Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement 
Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48207, 48257 (Aug. 13, 2012). 
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4. Manipulation Laws 
Despite legislative failure to grant jurisdictional authority over spot 
transactions to the CFTC, the Commission maintains some authority 
over these transactions through anti-manipulation provisions of the 
Act, § 9(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2).  The CEA provides that it shall be 
a felony for “[a]ny person to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the 
price of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery 
on or subject to the rules of any registered entity.”152  The CEA also 
provides that notwithstanding its explicit exclusion of foreign 
currency, such transactions are subject to the anti-manipulation 
provisions.153 
Historically, the CFTC has been largely unsuccessful in prosecuting 
manipulation claims.  “[T]he CFTC has only won one case in thirty-
seven years.”154  The CFTC has, however settled a number of claims 
and has successfully maintained actions by demonstrating such 
authority.155  The Dodd-Frank Act provides the CFTC with 
significantly expanded authority over manipulative conduct,156 and by 
such authority, the CFTC has promulgated new regulations.157  The 
Dodd-Frank Act added anti-manipulation language mirroring that of 
                                                                                                                 
 152. 7 U.S.C. § 13 (2014). 
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 154. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Revolution 
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 156. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 15 (2014).  The authority for the CFTC’s new anti-
manipulation regulations is section 753 of Dodd-Frank, which amends section 6(c) of 
the Commodity Exchange Act. See id. 
 157. Abrantes-Metz, Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 154, at 360 (citing 
Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulation and 
Deceptive Devices, Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41398 (July 14, 
2011)). 
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the well-known securities fraud SEC Rule 10b-5158 and thus adopted 
the expansive case law interpreting the statute, although the CFTC 
does not intend to be bound by those precedents.159  The Act also 
extended CFTC authority to reckless manipulative conduct.160 
The CEA has long prohibited manipulation, proven by four 
elements: (1) a manipulative act or omission; (2) intent; (3) causation; 
and (4) artificial price.161  Of these, the element of price artificiality 
has been called the sine qua non of manipulation.162  An artificial 
price is one that does not “reflect basic forces of supply and demand,” 
and creates “conditions which prevent the futures market from 
performing its basic economic function and hence [diminishes] its 
utility to those members of the trade and general public who rely on 
its basic purposes.”163  Meanwhile, attempted manipulation requires 
the showing of only two elements: intent and an overt act in 
furtherance of that intent, providing a lower bar for prosecution of 
such conduct.  Therefore, in the FX manipulation scheme, as in any 
scheme, the burden to prove attempted manipulation is lower than 
the burden to prove the four elements of manipulation itself. 
5. Charges Brought by CFTC in FX Manipulation 
On November 11, 2014, the CFTC issued Orders against five 
banks: Citibank, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase, The Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS), and UBS AG, filing and settling charges of 
attempted manipulation and aiding and abetting attempts to 
manipulate the FX benchmark, collectively resulting in $1.4 billion in 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Rule 10b-5 provides that it shall be unlawful “for any person, directly or 
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of 
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 159. Mark D. Young, “Summary of New CFTC Market Manipulation Rules”, 
SKADDEN (Nov. 30, 2010), https://www.skadden.com/insights/summary-new-cftc-
market-manipulation-rules [https://perma.cc/XS42-4WK2]. 
 160. Abrantes-Metz, Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 154, at 359. 
 161. Id. at 369-70. 
 162. Id. at 370. 
 163. Id. at 370 (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1158 (8th Cir. 1971)). 
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fines.164  On May 20, 2015, the CFTC filed a separate Order filing and 
settling the same charges against Barclays.165 
Although the CEA gives the CFTC authority over spot 
transactions in Section 2(c)(2)(C), the Order clearly incorporates a 
nexus to the derivatives market in stating: 
FX benchmark rates, including the WM/R Rates, are 
used to price a variety of transactions including foreign 
exchange swaps, cross-currency swaps, spot transactions, 
forwards, options, futures and other financial derivative 
instruments . . . . Accordingly, the integrity of the WM/R 
Rates and other FX benchmark rates is critical to the 
integrity of the markets in the United States and around 
the world.166 
The Orders charge that the banks lacked internal controls, failed to 
perceive the risks associated with participation in the FX benchmark 
rates, failed to adequately supervise their traders, and failed to 
monitor electronic chat rooms.167  The Orders also find the banks 
engaged in attempted manipulation, finding the two necessary 
elements of intent to affect the market price and an overt act.168  With 
the transcripts of the chat room discussions, the CFTC found that the 
traders “acted . . . with the purpose or conscious object of causing or 
effecting a price or price trend in the market that did not reflect 
legitimate forces of supply and demand.”169  The settlement of 
attempted manipulation did not require the CFTC to show that there 
would actually be an effect on the FX benchmark or the price of the 
transactions, as would have been necessary for a showing of market 
manipulation.170  The banks were also found liable for the acts of its 
traders through agency liability, and for aiding and abetting the 
attempted manipulation of other banks.171 
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B. Department of Justice 
1.  Sherman Antitrust Act 
Congress first enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890 out of 
concern regarding growing corporate organization and accompanying 
wealth accumulation in the late 1800s.172 
The Act consists of two short provisions, providing in relevant part: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall 
make any contract or engage in any combination or 
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony.173 
The Clayton Act, passed in 1914, provides the right for private 
parties to sue in federal district court for violations of the Sherman 
Act where they may receive treble damages and the cost of suit, 
including reasonable attorney’s fees.174 
2. Charges Brought by DOJ in FX Manipulation 
On May 20, 2015, the Department of Justice Criminal Division and 
Antitrust Division released agreements with Citicorp, JPMorgan 
Chase, Barclays, RBS, and UBS.175  Citicorp, JPMorgan Chase, 
Barclays, and RBS agreed to plead guilty to violations of the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act and agreed to pay fines totaling $2.5 billion.176  UBS 
pleaded guilty to manipulating the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR) after breaching its non-prosecution agreement in the 
resolution in that case, and agreed to pay a criminal penalty of $203 
million.177 
The Plea Agreements provide that Citicorp, JPMorgan Chase, 
Barclays, and RBS conspired to: 
                                                                                                                 
 172. Jason A. Casey, The Rule of Reason After Leegin: Reconsidering the Use of 
Economic Analysis in the Antitrust Arena, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 919, 922-23 
(2009). 
 173. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2014). 
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fix, stabilize, maintain, increase or decrease the price of, 
and rig bids and offers for, the euro/U.S. dollar 
(“EUR/USD”) currency pair178 exchanged in the foreign 
currency exchange spot market (“FX Spot Market”), 
which began at least as early as December 2007 and 
continued until at least January 2013, by agreeing to 
eliminate competition in the purchase and sale of the 
EUR/USD currency pair in the United States and 
elsewhere, in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1.179 
All five banks were able to secure waivers from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, allowing the companies to continue operating 
business unimpeded by their guilty pleas, including running mutual 
funds and issuing stocks, without deep regulatory review.180  At least 
one member of the SEC dissented to this decision, citing the 
“recidivism of these institutions” and stating that for the SEC to 
continually grant these waivers “has effectively rendered criminal 
convictions of financial institutions largely symbolic.”181  With these 
waivers, the banks proudly boast that these guilty pleas will have no 
practical effect on their corporations.182 
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C. Other U.S. Regulators 
1. Monetary Authorities 
The monetary authorities for the United States are the Department 
of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve. The Department of the 
Treasury is mandated with setting U.S. exchange rate policy since the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and with setting 
international financial policy. Practically, it is the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York that implements the Department of Treasury’s 
exchange rate policies, and thus these decisions are often made in 
consultation with the Federal Reserve.183  The U.S. Federal Reserve 
and the U.S. Treasury Department also pay close attention to FX 
markets and look for evidence of manipulation.184 
In connection to their roles in manipulating the foreign exchange 
rates, on May 20, 2015, the Federal Reserve imposed $1.8 billion in 
fines collectively against six banks185 in conjunction with the 
Department of Justice for “unsafe and unsound practices in the 
foreign exchange markets.”186  Along with the fines, the Federal 
Reserve issued cease and desist orders requiring each bank to 
improve their policies and oversight in the wholesale FX market.187  
The Federal Reserve required the banks “to improve senior 
management oversight, internal controls, risk management, internal 
audit policies, trading activities and procedures,” and prohibits the re-
employment of individuals involved in the manipulation scheme.188 
2. U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
On November 12, 2014, the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) announced it would impose a total $950 million fine 
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on three banks: Citibank, JPMorgan Chase, and Bank of America189 
for their role in unsound practices in the FX market.190  The OCC 
found the banks lacked sufficient internal controls and failed to detect 
traders’ improper business.  After their investigation, the OCC 
determined: 
[T]he traders disclosed confidential bank information, 
including customer orders and rate spreads.  The 
OCC’s examinations also found that traders discussed 
activity to trigger trading actions potentially 
detrimental to customers and beneficial to the trader 
or bank, and discussed pending orders and agreed not 
to trade in particular currencies.191 
3. New York Department of Financial Services 
On the same day the Department of Justice and Federal Reserve 
announced fines and criminal penalties in connection to FX market 
manipulation, the New York Department of Financial Services 
announced a fine against Barclays in connection with this same 
scheme for violations of New York Banking Law.192  In its press 
release, the NYDFS added that it would continue to investigate 
Barclays’ use of electronic FX trading.193  On November 18, 2015, the 
NYDFS announced an additional $150 million fine for Barclays’ use 
of its “Last Look” system194 in FX trading.195  The use of this 
electronic trading system would automatically reject any orders from 
the bank’s customers that would not ultimately be profitable.196 
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D. International Authorities 
The Heads of State and the Government of the Group of Twenty 
(G20) established the Financial Stability Board in 2009.197  The 
international body of twenty countries seeks to review and promote 
international financial stability.198  In response to concerns regarding 
the integrity of the FX markets, the Board has issued a report and set 
out a number of recommendations to reform the FX market and 
benchmark rates.199 
The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is a financial regulatory 
body in the United Kingdom, operating under the regulatory 
jurisdiction of the Financial Services Act of 2012.200  Spot transactions 
are not deemed to fall under this Act as a qualifying investment, and 
therefore, FX spot transactions cannot apply to the market abuse 
regime under the FCA’s Code of Market Conduct guidelines.201 
On November 12, 2014, the FCA announced they would impose a 
$1.7 billion fine on five banks, Citibank, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase, 
RBS, and UBS, for “failing to control business practices” related to 
the FX operations.202  On May 20, 2015, the FCA announced an 
additional 284 million GBP (approximately $441 million) fine on 
Barclays for the same.203  Noticeably, the fines were imposed because 
of the banks’ unsound internal practices, rather than for manipulating 
the FX markets.204  The FCA, in connection with the Bank of England 
and the HM Treasury,205 also established a review by the three U.K. 
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authorities to research and make recommendations regarding the 
foreign exchange market, along with others.206  This review, called the 
Fair and Effective Markets Review, has included recommendations 
and is widely cited in considerations of policy and regulatory change 
in this market.207 
The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) is 
“Switzerland’s independent financial-markets regulator.”208  FINMA 
issued an order against UBS on November 12, 2014 charging the bank 
with attempting to manipulate foreign benchmarks and fining the 
bank $139 million.209  FINMA also levied bans from the FX market 
against six traders at UBS in December 2015.210  In July, the Brazilian 
antitrust agency also began looking into FX manipulation affecting 
their currency, the real.211 
E. Internal Banking Regulations 
One of the most prominent reasons cited for the regulatory 
exemption of the FX markets for decades has been that the market is 
regulated by the banks’ internal regulations, and additional regulatory 
jurisdiction would be duplicitous.212  Additionally, as explained by the 
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Final Report of the Fair and Effective Markets Review, published in 
June 2015: “[r]eflecting the challenge of devising a single global 
regulatory framework for a market that trades around the clock 
across multiple jurisdictions, standards in spot FX have historically 
been guided by voluntary sets of principles drawn up on a national 
basis.”213  Yet, the report goes on to state: “[i]t became clear through 
recent enforcement cases that few firms had integrated the provisions 
of these codes into their internal control systems.”214  In fact, each 
regulatory body to bring charges or fines against the banks in 
connection with the FX manipulation, cited to the lack of internal 
controls and adequate oversight policies in addition to manipulation 
charges, if not exclusively.215  As a result, the banks have agreed to 
revamp their internal control structure and policies and procedures in 
order to address the issues exposed in light of these investigations.216 
F. Repercussions of the Manipulation Scheme 
The effects of the FX manipulation scheme are far from over.  As 
of yet, more than thirty traders have been fired,217 while one RBS 
trader was arrested in December 2014 although he was not charged 
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with an offense.218  Private lawsuits219 have been filed in the U.K. and 
the United States even before the investigation results were released 
and the banks pleaded guilty; some have been consolidated, some 
have settled, and some are outstanding.220  A further seven banks 
continue to face litigation in the United States from investors over 
forex rigging, including Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, and 
Standard Chartered.221  Bank of America settled a private lawsuit for 
its conduct in the FX scheme on April 29, 2015 for $180 million.222 
The economic impact of the scheme is difficult to define precisely.  
The manipulation “inflated the banks’ profits while harming countless 
consumers, investors and institutions around the globe — from 
pension funds to major corporations, and including the banks’ own 
customers,” according to U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch.223  
Britain’s chief market regulator recently called the exchange rate 
manipulation scheme the “biggest series of quantifiable wrongdoing 
in the history of our financial services industry.”224  As a result, the 
market expected a significant increase in regulation, although that has 
not happened quite yet.225 
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As it stands, there is no agency with regulatory jurisdiction over the 
spot market.  While the CFTC and DOJ prohibit and have 
enforcement authority over manipulation and collusion, respectively, 
there has yet to be any practical consequence of this manipulation 
scheme. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF REGULATORY PROPOSALS 
In light of the manipulation scandal, one contention that is largely 
understood is that change is inevitable in the FX market.  The 
prospect of new regulations or internal controls are expected to soon 
change the landscape of the market, “and plenty of potential solutions 
have been supplied, including creating a banking union, introducing a 
single-reserve currency, creating one global regulator, or putting FX 
trading on exchange, giving as a few examples.”226  However, it is far 
from agreed upon what these new regulations will look like and if 
they should come at all.  This Part discusses positions against and for 
additional regulations and various proposals for the FX market.  Part 
A details a number of arguments against additional regulations in the 
market.  Part B provides an explanation of those arguments for new 
regulations and oversight.  Part C provides an explanation of the 
criminal jurisdiction over the foreign currency market and the 
criminal consequences of the scheme. 
A. The Market Should Remain Unregulated 
The FX market, and the spot market in particular, is one of self-
regulation.  No agency monitors or has authority over it.227  The few 
regulations that exist stem from firms’ obligations as financial 
institutions and are governed by banking regulators.228  The banks 
themselves, who have adamantly argued for the preservation of this 
model,229 enforce these regulations and guidelines internally.230  One 
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important reason for this regulatory model is that market 
participants, major international banks, are all financially 
sophisticated and do not require the protection of regulations like 
those in the securities or derivatives market.231  The market’s 
international nature made comprehensive regulation impracticable 
and due to its massive size, the market was thought to be highly 
unlikely to be susceptible to manipulation.  As stated in 2012: 
“Fortunately, the FX market is sufficiently liquid that significant 
manipulation by any single actor is all but impossible during active 
trading hours for the major currencies.”232  Thus, the spot market has 
historically been free from intrusive regulations. 
Derivatives have all come under some form of regulation because 
of their speculative nature and inherent risk.  Spots have escaped such 
regulation because it is simply a sale of one currency for another – an 
even exchange at a negotiated price by two parties.  The Fourth 
Circuit explained, “[t]ransactions in the commodity itself which 
anticipate actual delivery did not present the same opportunities for 
speculation, manipulation, and outright wagering that trading in 
futures and options presented.”233  It is for this reason that the CEA 
has long excluded spot transactions explicitly from its regulations. 
Another reason cited for the lack of regulation in the spot FX 
market is that the market is self-regulating, in that the participants 
ensure the best prices and best practices even absent regulation.  
They are said to value their autonomy and try to ensure the integrity 
of the market. A central banker once said, “[i]t’s an entirely 
professional market and there’s honour among thieves.  The 
participants are keen on a clean market, not least because of the risk 
to reputation.”234  Similarly, the FX market was subject to market 
discipline.235  Purchasing firms and retail customers could withdraw 
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their business if they suspected misconduct among any of the other 
participants.236  The prospect of losing this business was said to have 
been a sufficient deterrent in itself to prevent misconduct.237 
Regulations on the FX market would also impede efficiency and 
liquidity.238  The market participants are already a part of a highly 
regulated industry, and would be “more properly supervised by the 
bank regulatory agencies.”239  It is generally understood that any 
increase in transparency will come at a price, negatively affecting 
liquidity, which is said to be the beating heart of the global FX 
market.240  Regulation, which tends to lock in prices and obstruct 
necessary flexibility that has thus far been a touchstone of the FX 
market, would also impede further evolution of the market through 
the use of technology.241 
In addition to their impediment on market efficiency, many argue 
that regulations are simply not necessary and would not actually solve 
the issues facing the FX market today.  To think even a global 
regulatory scheme will prevent collusion among top-tiered banks is 
probably a naïve assumption.242  These market makers will “always 
have an opportunity to ‘fix’ benchmark prices.”243  No amount of 
regulations can universally solve the issue of market manipulation, 
but will only serve to shift the details of its origin and structure.244 
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Increased regulations in the United States may incentivize big 
banks to take their business to other nations without such intrusive 
laws.  Banks may change the focus of their business to other countries 
or move their entire business offshore,245 posing a detriment to the 
U.S. markets.246  New regulations in the United States in a global 
market could also cause “fragmentation . . . regulatory arbitrage,247 
and in the worst case . . . a race to the bottom.”248  One fear is that 
new regulations would either cause market prices to vary, not because 
of the supply or demand of the market but exclusively because of the 
effect of the regulations themselves, creating a disparity of prices.  An 
additional concern is that countries would compete with each other to 
create the most appealing regulatory scheme to financial institutions 
in order to attract their business, and ultimately harm the market 
itself because of ineffective regulations. 
Finally, many argue that the FX market should not come under the 
view of a strict regulatory scheme because of the “unintended 
consequences” that could result.  This same concern was raised by 
both the U.S. Treasury Department regarding the regulation of FX 
instruments249 and the Association for 
Financial Markets in Europe regarding the possible results of 
regulating the FX market in Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive II (MiFID II), a new piece of legislation for financial reform 
in Europe.250  Likewise, others have implored that regulators do not 
enact a legal regime out of “hysteria and ignorance,”251 regulating for 
the sake of regulating instead of carefully identifying what exactly 
would solve the issues faced by the FX market today. 
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1. Proposals to Maintain Self-Regulation 
Many international regulatory bodies seem to support the self-
regulatory model in citing the banks’ internal failures as the purpose 
for the manipulation.  On March 30, 2015, eight foreign exchange 
committees from different nations came together and published a 
“Global Preamble: Codes of Best Market Practice and Shared Global 
Principles.”252  The Global Preamble serves as guidance of ethical 
standards and behavior for the industry regarding a number of 
practices, including client confidentiality and market conduct, 
personal conduct, and policies for best execution practices.253  In its 
Fair and Effective Markets Review, the Financial Conduct Authority 
and the Bank of England recommend the adoption of a single code of 
conduct for the industry.254  In addition, the Bank of International 
Settlement set up a working group to develop behavior standards for 
FX traders, building off of the established framework of the Global 
Preamble.255  This code will go into effect in May 2017.256  It will be up 
to the banks and each government to enforce the rules and it is 
unclear what, if any, consequences there will be to violations.257 
Other changes have been aimed at reducing the possibility of 
trader manipulation in the way trades are actually carried out.  For 
example, since the manipulation scheme has come to light there has 
been an increased use of algorithmic trading.258  One estimate suggests 
that 90% of orders are placed using algorithms, compared with about 
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5% before the manipulation investigation.259  With the use of these 
algorithms, banks can simply act as an intermediary when taking 
client orders in providing the service of connecting the orders to 
trading platforms rather than taking on the order, and the risk, 
themselves.260  In exchange, instead of making a profit off of the 
clients’ positions, banks charge a fee for this service.261 
B. Regulations are Necessary 
Since the FX market manipulation scheme has become public, 
there are also advocates in favor of creating a regulatory regime for 
the still unregulated spot FX market.  One thing these advocates 
agree on is the ineffectiveness of internal banking controls.  In 2001, 
sixteen of the top banks signed a voluntary code of conduct for their 
practices in the FX market.262  A standard code of conduct presents a 
fundamental issue: that it remains up to the banks to implement them 
on their own.263  The Financial Conduct Authority stated, “[t]he 
banks’ failures to establish adequate systems and controls are what 
allowed the traders to manipulate the fixed rate across the world’s 
largest currencies.”264  Simon Potter, head of markets at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York said that, previously, banks may have 
intentionally disregarded the industry’s best practices, identifying an 
important issue in the self-regulatory model.265 
Even with new internal controls, regulators are still advocating for 
more to be done. 266  Officials from central banks across the world 
have warned banks that “more restrictive regulation is inevitable” if 
they did not act on new standards and recommendations.267  Others 
suggest that even if banks successfully implement codes of conduct, 
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that will not be enough.  Codes of conduct will be a “complement to 
regulation,” but regulation will still be necessary.268 
An independent review by the Bank of England explained that the 
structure of the FX market lends itself to “conflicts of interests; 
limited transparency; poor benchmark design; market concentration; 
and a reduction in the effectiveness of market discipline.”269  
Specifically, some financial actors thought transparency was enhanced 
by the increased use of electronic systems.270  Yet, a recent study 
discovered that 80% of market participants think the FX market 
needs more transparency.271  Another article explains, “there is an 
almost complete lack of transparency in forex.”272  Thus, it is clear 
that the transparency gained by the use of electronic systems is not 
nearly enough for investors to be made aware of the specific data 
necessary to provide clarity to the now opaque market.  It is 
commonly accepted that transparency should be the common goal of 
the market despite whatever costs may come with it.273 
Similarly, the FX market was thought to have been governed by 
the discipline of the market.  Banks understood they would lose 
business if it was discovered that they attempted to abuse the market, 
“[a]nd that knowledge was thought to be the most powerful way of 
sustaining broadly well-functioning and sound markets.”274  The 
understanding that this is not actually how the market works has left a 
leader in the industry to even question the value of a debate of 
whether there ever “was a historic ‘golden age’ when the real world 
actually worked like this.”275   The Fair and Effective Markets Review 
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found that market discipline was either lacking or non-existent in FX. 
276  This is because of three reasons: there are few alternative firms 
to buy from if misconduct is discovered; the need to maintain 
relationships with other firms; and the difficulty of detecting market 
abuse.277  This mismatch between the financial interests of the banks 
and their shareholders and those of society is now widely 
understood.278 
In response to concerns about efficiency, advocates for regulation 
note that much of what makes the FX market efficient would be 
deemed illegal in other markets.279  A notable example is the practice 
of front-running, which is legal in the FX market.280  Front-running is 
defined as “the practice whereby an individual is trading in possession 
of private information about an order designed to take advantage of 
the anticipated price effect of a future order.”281  In FX front-running, 
once a bank receives an order to be placed at the fix rate, banks trade 
in the opposite direction as their customers in order to hedge against 
market shifts.  For example, if a client placed an order to buy 500 
million euros to be executed at the fix price, which at that time was 
$1.1200, a trader would begin to buy euros in the market.282  This 
activity would begin to push the price up so that the trader would sell 
the euros for $1.1250 to the customer when he purchased them at an 
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average rate of $1.1225.  The bank’s profit would be $.0025.  Banks 
argue this is a necessary practice in risk management, to protect 
against market volatility and the chance that the price would drop 
when they promise to trade at the fix price.283  On the other hand, the 
customer ends up paying a higher price than he would have without 
this practice.284 
Although front-running is illegal in other markets, in the FX 
market, reports have characterized this practice in a number of ways 
such as “part of the game” in FX trading with “absolutely no legal 
repercussions”285 to “bad practice” 286 to “unacceptable.”287  Market 
participants indicated a need for clarification of the fine line between 
acceptable hedging and unacceptable front-running of client orders.288  
In any event, collusive front-running has never been acceptable in any 
market, including FX. 
Along with the need to provide clarity is the need to protect 
market integrity and to recreate public trust where it has been lost.289  
The loss of public trust in the FX market has been a detriment to its 
efficiency, created uncertainty among investors, and increased the 
cost of management, resources, and compensation necessary to risk 
taking.290  To rebuild the public trust in the market, the Fair and 
Efficient Market Review recommends both domestic regulatory 
reform, and international cooperation among regulators.291 
1. Proposals/Solutions 
The industry has widely come to terms with the inevitability of 
change to the market, and the call for a global reform is nearly 
universal in proposals to response to the FX market manipulation.292  
The globalization of the financial markets demands consistency and 
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cooperation in both regulatory development and implementation.293  
Any new regulatory regime, without global coordination risks 
“fragmentation . . . regulatory arbitrage, and in the worst case . . . a 
race to the bottom.”294  In providing its recommendations, the Bank of 
England agreed that, provided the international scope of the FX 
markets, it is vital that the governing principles should be agreed to 
internationally.295 
There has been a move to change the structure of market 
operations, with the goal of preventing opportunities for market 
abuse.  The WM/Reuters benchmark timeframe has been increased to 
five minutes from the previous one-minute window and now obtains 
data from a wider range of sources in the calculation.296  While this 
has reduced the scope of manipulation, it has also reportedly 
decreased market liquidity, as banks respond to “greater uncertainty 
over the fix level,” by increasing bid-offer spreads.297  This is reported 
to have increased trading costs by about 37%.298  The FX benchmark, 
along with six other financial benchmarks, has also been brought 
under the U.K. regulatory regime as of April 2015.299 
There are also proposals of imposing regulations on the market.  
Some suggest putting the FX market on central trading exchanges.300  
Advocates argue this would increase transparency, and limit the 
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possibility of manipulation.301  On the other hand, critics argue this 
would hamper competition and innovation, create risks and push up 
prices.302  The Financial Conduct Authority and the Bank of England 
have also identified the lack of regulatory jurisdiction over the spot 
FX market as an issue in their Fair and Efficient Markets Review.303  
They have proposed a new civil and criminal market abuse regime to 
be created for the spot market specifically.304 
C. Criminal Sanctions 
As a result of the manipulation scheme, four banks pled guilty to 
the Department of Justice to violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act, punishable by a prison term of up to ten years for an individual.  
Six banks settled charges of attempted manipulation with the CFTC, 
a crime also punishable by a prison term of up to ten years for an 
individual found guilty.  Yet, no individual traders have been 
prosecuted for this egregious misconduct. 
This is not due to a general policy decision by the Department of 
Justice not to prosecute antitrust or market manipulation crimes.  The 
Antitrust Department charged sixty-three individuals with criminal 
offenses in 2012, thirty-four in 2013, and forty-four in 2014.305  
Nineteen executives were charged and four executives were sent to 
prison for price fixing in the airline industry in 2011.306  In the year 
leading up to its Spring 2015 report, the Antitrust Department 
charged thirty individuals in connection with real estate foreclosure 
auctions.307 
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In addition to antitrust charges, the U.S. Department of Justice and 
authorities around the world have taken criminal action against 
traders who manipulate the markets.308  In November 2015, a jury in 
the Southern District of New York found two traders guilty of 
conspiracy and wire fraud in connection with the manipulation of 
LIBOR.309  A LIBOR trader in London was found guilty in August 
2015 and sentenced to eleven years in prison upon appeal in 
December of that same year for manipulating the benchmark.310  
Similarly, commodities trader Michael Coscia was the first person to 
have been charged with the CFTC’s new anti-spoofing311 authority 
under the Dodd-Frank Act and was found guilty by a jury in 
November 2015.312 
The CFTC also likely has authority to bring criminal charges in 
connection with the FX manipulation.  As it stands, the Commodities 
Exchange Act makes it a felony to manipulate commodities.  The 
requirements for attempted manipulation are: (1) an intent and (2) an 
overt act in furtherance of that intent.  Regarding the intent element, 
the circuits are split regarding whether fraud is necessary to charge 
this offense.313  As explained below, the Fifth Circuit requires a 
showing of fraud or manipulation, whereas the Second Circuit does 
not. 
In United States v. Radley, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a decision to 
grant a motion to dismiss a criminal indictment for manipulation 
under the CEA because the conduct charged involved only legitimate 
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trades in the market place and created legally enforceable contracts.314  
The Court explained: “[a]cting in a manner that shifts the price of a 
commodity in a favorable direction is the business of profit-making 
enterprises, and if it is done without fraud or misrepresentation, it 
does not clearly violate the CEA.”315  The Court specified that it 
supported its conclusion with an analysis of the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act Section 10(b) in securities manipulation cases.316 
In CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, LLC, the Southern District of 
New York distinguished manipulation under the CEA and the 
Securities Exchange Act.  The Court noted that Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act prohibited both fraud and manipulation, 
whereas the CEA has two separate sections for anti-fraud and anti-
manipulation provisions, finding “[w]hen the statute distinguishes 
fraud and manipulation by addressing them in different provisions, it 
would be redundant to construe manipulation to require a fraud 
element.”317  The Court ultimately concluded that the only requisite 
intent necessary to pursue a manipulation charge under the CEA was 
“that the accused acted (or failed to act) with the purpose or 
conscious object of causing or effecting a price or price trend in the 
market that did not reflect the legitimate forces of supply and 
demand.”318  This was the definition the CFTC cited in their 
settlement agreements with the banks for attempted manipulation.319 
The CFTC has taken the position of the Second Circuit in 
promulgating its anti-manipulation authority under the Dodd-Frank 
Act in its adoption of Rule 180.2.320  The Commission “emphasizes, 
consistent with the weight of existing precedent, that the conduct 
giving rise to a manipulation charge need not itself be fraudulent or 
otherwise illegal.”321  Yet, despite this explanation of the CFTC’s 
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interpretation, the law has not yet been settled.322  The dispute 
remains open and a resolution may have to be decided ultimately by 
the Supreme Court.323 
Aside from the issue of the requisite intent needed to charge a 
defendant, there is a dispute about whether or not, even with the 
statutory authority to do so, it would be an effective policy to charge 
individual traders at all.  Those against charging individual traders 
contend that “[a]ggressive traders will become timid if they are 
punished” both when their trading strategies do not turn out 
favorably or if their strategies are too successful and they make large 
profits to the detriment of other market participants.324  This chilling 
effect would come from other participants accusing traders of market 
manipulation or unfair practices if they are too successful and the 
trader’s own firms or clients punishing them if their strategies are 
unsuccessful.  Another argument is that traders should not be 
prosecuted for their activities when they were performed at the 
behest of senior management who either knew, or stayed willingly 
blind to their traders’ misconduct.325 
On the other hand, not prosecuting the traders who actually 
committed these crimes, and allowing them to walk without 
consequence, is an ineffective criminal policy.  A common strategy 
among defense attorneys representing corporations and their 
employees was to negotiate a deal where the corporation would plead 
guilty and pay a fee, in exchange for employees not being charged.326  
Such a settlement policy has no deterrent effect whatsoever, either 
specifically against the individuals involved or generally against 
financial crime. 
Although the Department of Justice obtained felony pleas from the 
corporations, the banks themselves acknowledge that their guilty 
pleas are not expected to have any practical impact on their 
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operations.327  This is evidenced in that, despite hefty fines, most of 
the banks did not suffer any financial losses.328  An SDNY judge 
argues that not bringing charges against individuals “depicts weakness 
in the prosecutorial system.”329  Larry Breur, once head of the 
Criminal Division at the DOJ said “[t]he strongest deterrent against 
corporate crime is the prospect of prison time for individual 
employees.”330  The complete lack of punishment altogether may in 
fact reward this criminal behavior and incentivize such crimes, as 
evidenced by the repeated misconduct by the same institutions.331 
In reaction to these criticisms, the Department of Justice released a 
memo in September 2015 stating that it would begin to focus its 
resources on the prosecution of individual executives.332  In releasing 
its new policy, the DOJ acknowledged that there had not been many 
individual convictions within the financial sector and emphasized that 
it will work to ensure an equal enforcement of the law for those “on a 
street corner or in a boardroom” alike.333  The practical effects of this 
position are yet to be seen. 
IV.  SHIFT TOWARD A REGULATED MARKET 
When asked why it took regulators so long to discover that a 
market of this scale was being rigged in such an extraordinary way, a 
director of the Financial Conduct Authority, a financial regulatory 
body in the United Kingdom answered: “These are not regulated 
markets.  We have taken swift action as soon as information [about 
the misbehavior] came to light . . . . I don’t accept that regulators have 
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taken too long.”334  Meanwhile, the FCA charged the banks for 
behavior beginning in 2008 and this press conference was held in 
2014.335  The CEO of the FCA answered, “It’s a subtle point but it’s 
quite an important point . . . . The spot FX market is not a regulated 
market.  Where it’s not a regulated market, we don’t get regular 
reports . . . . We don’t have things we can monitor.”336  The U.S. 
Department of Justice charged the banks with the same behavior 
dating back to 2007 until 2013.337  For six years, in the largest market 
in the world, FX traders at a handful of banks around the world 
rigged the price mechanism that is the “anchor to our entire economic 
system.”338  A director at the FCA does not even accept the premise 
that it took regulators too long to discover this misconduct because 
these markets are not regulated.339  The experiment of self-regulation 
may have been a valid economic theory at one point.  However, the 
market has proven that with enough incentive and freedom, even the 
greatest of markets will be manipulated.  To leave the FX market 
unregulated at this point should not be an option up for 
consideration. 
Multiple goals of financial regulation are at odds here: protection 
of individual investors, the integrity of the market, and efficiency.  
Advocates against regulation in the spot FX market stress that the 
parties are sophisticated, do not need the protection of regulators, 
and that the efficiency of the market depends upon its self-regulatory 
model.340  While this is true, “no amount of counterparty 
sophistication” can protect the market from manipulation or 
collusion.341  To cling to the solution of party sophistication is to 
simply distract from the real issue at stake.  The integrity of the 
market and public trust must be protected independently of the 
market participants.  The regulations imposed on the market will not 
be for the purpose of ensuring fairness to the banks’ counterparties in 
the spot FX market.  It will be to prevent manipulation and to ensure 
market integrity.  In regards to efficiency, “[e]fficient markets require 
certainty, risk, transparency, liquidity and innovation.”342  Regulations 
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will at the same time create transparency and public trust in the 
market, while not detracting from the risk taking possibilities or the 
market’s innovation by simply requiring firms to report their 
transactions. 
A code of conduct or best practices will not solve the issues facing 
the FX market because these solutions have the same inherent 
problems that allowed this manipulation scheme to occur.  They rely 
on the banks to implement them.  They, again, allow the banks to 
decide when and how to incorporate these principles.  The issue was 
not with the substance of the code of conduct signed by sixteen banks 
in 2001; it was that they didn’t implement it.  They didn’t implement it 
because it was not mandated, and competing interests fell in favor of 
not mandating a non-binding code.  There has been important 
progress made in the development of a new code of conduct, signed in 
March 2015, “but there is a widely held view that little more can be 
done to enforce a set of principles upon the market and coerce 
participants to behave accordingly.”343  The actors and firms within 
this industry will not adhere to any principles, at least for an extended 
period of time, unless they are mandated and are a prerequisite to 
their participation in the market at all. 
This regulation scheme needs to be led by the United States and 
United Kingdom.344  The Fair and Effective Markets Review has 
already recommended a new civil and criminal market abuse scheme 
for regulating the spot FX market.  The recommendation includes a 
requirement on firms, inter alia, “to keep records of orders and 
transactions, and report suspicious cases to the regulator.”345  A 
similar regulatory regime is necessary in the United States.  The 
adoption of a similar regime to the United Kingdom’s will allay 
concerns about regulatory arbitrage and fragmentation. 
Although it does not present identical concerns as the derivative 
instruments, such as betting on future prices, the risk of market 
manipulation of the spot markets is proven to be a legitimate and 
very real concern.  Regulation here will be concerned with protecting 
the integrity of the market itself, rather than protecting any individual 
investors or market participants from transactions within it.  This new 
regulatory approach will recognize that the spot market is not solely 
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worthy of protection if it serves as a proxy for other derivative 
instruments but that it is independently worthy of its own legal 
protection. 
This Part provides two solutions: (A) a new regulatory regime in 
the United States and (B) criminal penalties for manipulation of the 
spot FX market. 
A. Regulate the Spot Market Explicitly 
This new approach recognizes that the spot FX market needs to 
come under regulatory jurisdiction, and new regulations need to be 
adopted with the goal of effective monitoring and manipulation 
prevention.  Despite the fact that the banks have paid billions of 
dollars in fines, some unquantifiable damage has undisputedly been 
done and it is false hope to expect these fines to deter future criminal 
behavior of these institutions.  Monitoring is necessary to prevent 
prolonged manipulation in the first place.  Of the U.S. financial 
agencies, the CFTC is the most viable candidate to take on this new 
role in the spot market.  The CFTC already closely monitors FX 
futures and forwards and has an aggressive enforcement and market 
surveillance program in place.346 
Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, data on FX swaps must be 
reported to new CFTC regulated entities called “swap data 
repositories” (SDRs).347  This requirement is intended to “reduce 
systemic risk, increase transparency and promote market integrity 
within the financial system.”348  SDRs collect real time data of the 
creation and continuation of swaps in the FX market and their data is 
available to the CFTC at all times. 
With the exception of the continuing data, a similar reporting 
system or a “spot data repository” would fit the needs of the spot 
market as well.  This can be done by amending the Commodities 
Exchange Act §2(a)(13)(g).  The subsection now reads: “Each swap 
(whether cleared or uncleared) shall be reported to a registered swap 
data repository.”349  Amending this section to state: “Each swap and 
FX spot transaction . . . ” would include the spot market within the 
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reporting requirements that are intended to enhance transparency 
and integrity in the opaque OTC markets.  This solution would 
require “spot data repositories” to collect transaction reports, to keep 
necessary records and to report suspicious cases to the CFTC.  The 
CFTC and the public would have access to this information as well. 
The adoption of this new regulatory system for the spot FX market 
would not only provide necessary transparency and prevention 
measures for market manipulation, but it will also enhance the public 
confidence and market integrity in the foreign currency market which 
is critical to its success. 
B. Criminal Sanctions 
Upon announcement of the bank’s guilty plea, Citigroup CEO 
stated that “the behavior . . . is an embarrassment to our firm and 
stands in stark contrast to Citi’s values.”350  The banks explained away 
their conduct by the bad behavior of a small number of employees.  
For example, JPMorgan Chairman and CEO Jamie Dimon stated: 
“The lesson here is that the conduct of a small group of employees, or 
of even a single employee, can reflect badly on all of us.”351  UBS 
CEO Sergio Ermotti and Chairman Axel Weber said: “The conduct 
of a small number of employees was unacceptable and we have taken 
appropriate disciplinary actions.”352  Barclays CEO Antony Jenkins 
stated: “I share the frustration of shareholders and colleagues that 
some individuals have once more brought our company and industry 
into disrepute.”353  JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon even went so far as 
to claim that the “banks are under assault.”354 
Even with billions of dollars in fines, though, and criminal felony 
pleas, the banks have not experienced any practical repercussions.  In 
fact, the shares of Barclays and UBS all went up when the DOJ fines 
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were announced because their penalties were lower than expected.355  
The banks also announced that their guilty pleas are not expected to 
have any practical impact on their operations.356  What, then, was the 
consequence of rigging the biggest market in the world? 
These inconsequential prosecutions are unlikely to create any 
illusion that the DOJ takes these offenses seriously enough to actually 
cause a deterrent effect.  The purpose of such prosecutions is not just 
to punish those involved, but to deter the next potential financial 
manipulation around the corner.357  The incentive structure needs to 
be reversed so that banks will not ultimately profit from manipulating 
the market without consequence, and it is the government’s proper 
role to step in to impose proper criminal sanctions.  Only when 
proper criminal sanctions are imposed and prosecuted against the 
individuals responsible for this criminal behavior will this conduct be 
deterred. 
Concerns about a potential chilling effect of legitimate trade 
practices can be addressed by requiring that the CFTC or the DOJ 
prove manipulative intent as an indispensable element of the offense.  
This has already been addressed by one court, which has held in one 
instance of securities manipulation that the “SEC must prove that but 
for the manipulative intent, the defendant would not have conducted 
the transaction.”358  With this but-for requirement, concerns about 
legitimate trade activity are severely outweighed by the necessity of 
enforcing the anti-manipulation laws that exist. 
The Commodities Exchange Act already makes manipulation in 
the foreign exchange spot market a felony.  Section 2(c)(2)(C) 
provides that transactions in foreign exchange shall not be exempt 
from the anti-manipulation sections of the CEA, notwithstanding its 
exemption otherwise.  The issue is that the DOJ has simply chosen 
not to enforce it in this particular case.  An additional statute would 
be redundant, and would not make it more likely that it would be 
enforced.  The DOJ may be concerned about the element of intent, 
and that courts may choose to require fraud in enforcing this statute.  
However, the CFTC has already taken the position that this is not 
necessary, and courts in the Second Circuit have agreed. 
In September 2015, the DOJ issued a memorandum that it would 
take a harsher stance against individual executives in white-collar 
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crime, where they had not done so before.  At this point it will be up 
to the DOJ to act on its assertion and to dedicate the resources 
necessary to take a critical stance against the individuals actually 
committing the crimes corporations have thus far pleaded guilty to. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note began by explaining how the foreign currency market 
began as a fixed market under the Bretton Woods Agreement.  With 
the collapse of this system, currency rates were allowed to float 
against one another and speculation developed into a huge sector of 
the FX market.  These derivative instruments and nearly all 
international financial markets depend upon spot benchmarks.  It was 
these benchmarks that a handful of traders at the biggest financial 
institutions colluded to manipulate. 
Advocates against regulation in the spot FX market stress that the 
parties are sophisticated, do not need the protection of regulators, 
and that the efficiency of the market depends upon its self-regulatory 
model.  While this is true, no amount of counterparty sophistication 
can protect the market from manipulation or collusion.  To cling to 
the solution of party sophistication is to simply distract from the real 
issue at stake.  The integrity of the market and public trust must be 
protected independently of the market participants. 
In order to achieve this goal, this Note advocates the daily 
monitoring of the spot FX market through a system similar, or 
identical, to the swap data repositories already in place under Dodd – 
Frank.  This Note also advocates for the effective enforcement of the 
criminal laws already in place in order to create an effective deterrent 
to recidivist financial institutions.  With these changes implemented, 
the forex market will be able to move beyond its current state of the 
unregulated “Wild West” into a market of laws and accountability. 
